What Kenya and its allies can learn from Austria’s Nazi legacy.
BY JAMES VERINI | MARCH 20, 2013
NAIROBI — For now, Uhuru Kenyatta is the president-elect of Kenya. On Saturday, March 9, after a week of suspense following voting, he bested his main rival and former boss, Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who's challenging
the results in court (and now claims, without furnishing much evidence,
that he won). This is causing a lot of handwringing among allies of Kenya's
who make human rights a centerpiece of their foreign policies, because
Kenyatta is facing trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the
violent wake of the last election, in 2007, ICC prosecutors allege,
Kenyatta helped organize death squads.
Before this election, U.S. and European officials let out vague minatory
noises about what would be done if Kenyatta won. U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State Johnnie Carson warned, in what may have been the most embittering
and most meaningless phrase of the campaign, that "choices have
consequences." Kenyans have chosen. Now those consequences have to be
defined. What they may entail, beyond making a point of not phoning
Kenyatta to congratulate him, no one has said publically, but it's commonly
agreed that the situation is unprecedented.
NAIROBI — For now, Uhuru Kenyatta is the president-elect of Kenya. On Saturday, March 9, after a week of suspense following voting, he bested his main rival and former boss, Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who's challenging
the results in court (and now claims, without furnishing much evidence,
that he won). This is causing a lot of handwringing among allies of Kenya's
who make human rights a centerpiece of their foreign policies, because
Kenyatta is facing trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the
violent wake of the last election, in 2007, ICC prosecutors allege,
Kenyatta helped organize death squads.
Before this election, U.S. and European officials let out vague minatory
noises about what would be done if Kenyatta won. U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State Johnnie Carson warned, in what may have been the most embittering
and most meaningless phrase of the campaign, that "choices have
consequences." Kenyans have chosen. Now those consequences have to be
defined. What they may entail, beyond making a point of not phoning
Kenyatta to congratulate him, no one has said publically, but it's commonly
agreed that the situation is unprecedented.
The West has had to deal with
reprobates already in power, but never has it suffered the anxiety of
watching a man accused of crimes against humanity run for and then win the
highest office in a friendly nation (and with British counsel). The
journalist Steve Coll wrote in the New Yorker that "Kenyatta might well
become the first democratically elected alleged criminal on that scale in
history."
That's not entirely true. A quarter-century ago, the United States and
Europe faced a similar diplomatic tribulation. This one, closer to home,
involved Nazis. Peculiarly Mitteleuropean though it was in tone, it
provides an instructive precedent for what might be called "The Kenyatta
Affair."
In 1986, Kurt Waldheim ran for the presidency of Austria. Waldheim, who'd
served as his country's foreign minister and then secretary general of the
United Nations, was vain and unburdened by excessive intelligence (he once
used his U.N. diplomatic pouch to send soft American toilet paper back to
Europe) but otherwise seemed innocuous. Austrians, and most of the rest of
the world, believed he came with a reasonably clean bill of history.
reprobates already in power, but never has it suffered the anxiety of
watching a man accused of crimes against humanity run for and then win the
highest office in a friendly nation (and with British counsel). The
journalist Steve Coll wrote in the New Yorker that "Kenyatta might well
become the first democratically elected alleged criminal on that scale in
history."
That's not entirely true. A quarter-century ago, the United States and
Europe faced a similar diplomatic tribulation. This one, closer to home,
involved Nazis. Peculiarly Mitteleuropean though it was in tone, it
provides an instructive precedent for what might be called "The Kenyatta
Affair."
In 1986, Kurt Waldheim ran for the presidency of Austria. Waldheim, who'd
served as his country's foreign minister and then secretary general of the
United Nations, was vain and unburdened by excessive intelligence (he once
used his U.N. diplomatic pouch to send soft American toilet paper back to
Europe) but otherwise seemed innocuous. Austrians, and most of the rest of
the world, believed he came with a reasonably clean bill of history.
Waldheim had always maintained that after Germany's 1938 annexation of
Austria, he'd been conscripted into the army, sent to the eastern front,
invalided by a grenade, discharged, and then returned to Vienna, where he
sat out the remainder of hostilities studying law and rubbing his shattered
ankle. He claimed he'd never even bothered to join the National Socialist
party. (To see how well-practiced the story was, watch this 1974 television
interview.)
But for years, rumors circulated that Waldheim was lying. In the U.N.
archives sat a file, opened by its War Crime Commission in 1948, which said
that Waldheim was connected with a massacre of prisoners in the Balkans and
was wanted there for war crimes. The file was mysteriously closed when
Waldheim considered running for a third term as secretary general in 1980.
Austria, he'd been conscripted into the army, sent to the eastern front,
invalided by a grenade, discharged, and then returned to Vienna, where he
sat out the remainder of hostilities studying law and rubbing his shattered
ankle. He claimed he'd never even bothered to join the National Socialist
party. (To see how well-practiced the story was, watch this 1974 television
interview.)
But for years, rumors circulated that Waldheim was lying. In the U.N.
archives sat a file, opened by its War Crime Commission in 1948, which said
that Waldheim was connected with a massacre of prisoners in the Balkans and
was wanted there for war crimes. The file was mysteriously closed when
Waldheim considered running for a third term as secretary general in 1980.
As he readied his presidential bid in Austria six years later, however, the
file reappeared, along with other files from other archives indicating that
Waldheim had not just been a Nazi, but one hell of a Nazi. He'd joined a
Nazi youth organization three weeks after the Anschluss, then the
Brownshirts, and then served on the staff of a general involved in the
Final Solution, who was later hanged in Belgrade. In addition to the
Balkans massacre, for which Waldheim was decorated, he was, the evidence
indicated, involved in the deportations of Greek Jews.
The first people to connect the dots were Waldheim's opponents in Austria's
Socialist party. They contacted a Vienna magazine, which printed the
revelations. No one in Austria much cared. So the World Jewish Congress, an
international advocacy organization, sent its general counsel to Vienna to
investigate, and he brought his findings to the New York Times. Confronted
by the paper, Waldheim slipped into the exculpatory-yet-incriminating
ungrammar that would constitute his responses to the allegations for the
rest of his life. "I regret these things most deeply," he told the
reporter, and "it is really the first that I hear that such things
happened."
What transpired next still astounds. Waldheim's opponents assumed that
their exposures would provoke international condemnation and force Waldheim
to drop out of the race (the World Jewish Congress gave him three days to
fold). They were half right. Countries from Canada to Britain got in a
lather. But they underestimated Waldheim's glibness, and overestimated the
national conscience.
file reappeared, along with other files from other archives indicating that
Waldheim had not just been a Nazi, but one hell of a Nazi. He'd joined a
Nazi youth organization three weeks after the Anschluss, then the
Brownshirts, and then served on the staff of a general involved in the
Final Solution, who was later hanged in Belgrade. In addition to the
Balkans massacre, for which Waldheim was decorated, he was, the evidence
indicated, involved in the deportations of Greek Jews.
The first people to connect the dots were Waldheim's opponents in Austria's
Socialist party. They contacted a Vienna magazine, which printed the
revelations. No one in Austria much cared. So the World Jewish Congress, an
international advocacy organization, sent its general counsel to Vienna to
investigate, and he brought his findings to the New York Times. Confronted
by the paper, Waldheim slipped into the exculpatory-yet-incriminating
ungrammar that would constitute his responses to the allegations for the
rest of his life. "I regret these things most deeply," he told the
reporter, and "it is really the first that I hear that such things
happened."
What transpired next still astounds. Waldheim's opponents assumed that
their exposures would provoke international condemnation and force Waldheim
to drop out of the race (the World Jewish Congress gave him three days to
fold). They were half right. Countries from Canada to Britain got in a
lather. But they underestimated Waldheim's glibness, and overestimated the
national conscience.
His opponents failed to appreciate that Austrians,
Hitler's real Landsmänner, had never seen the point in the paroxysms of
guilt suffered by his adopted countrymen the Germans. Many Austrian
politicians of Waldheim's generation had been proud Nazis, some with more
appalling résumés than his. The president of parliament, Friedrich Peter,
had served in an S.S. extermination unit and had probably personally killed
hundreds. As late as the 1980s, Austria was lousy with Hitler nostalgists.
Hitler's real Landsmänner, had never seen the point in the paroxysms of
guilt suffered by his adopted countrymen the Germans. Many Austrian
politicians of Waldheim's generation had been proud Nazis, some with more
appalling résumés than his. The president of parliament, Friedrich Peter,
had served in an S.S. extermination unit and had probably personally killed
hundreds. As late as the 1980s, Austria was lousy with Hitler nostalgists.
These weren't thugs in black nylon and crew-cuts, either, but everyday
people, the satisfied children of historian Daniel Goldhagen's willing
executioners, if not the executioners themselves. In 2010, I interviewed
Neal Sher, who was at the time of the Waldheim Affair, as it came to be
known, the chief prosecutor in the Office of Special Investigations, the
U.S. Justice Department division that investigates war criminals. Sher
recalled a pair of old Austrian women who, having seen his picture in the
newspaper, approached him in a Vienna café. He smiled and greeted them.
"Judenschweine!" they hissed back.
Waldheim's campaign managers, on the other hand, understood Austria
perfectly. Even while he denied the charges, they designed campaign posters
that looked like National Socialist propaganda. They warned crowds of a
Jewish plot emanating from New York. (At the same time, because of his
years at the U.N., Waldheim chose as his campaign theme song "New York, New
York.") It worked. The Socialists realized that every time they brought up
the war, they didn't win voters, but lost them. Someone, maybe from
Waldheim's campaign, maybe just a fed-up citizen, posted flyers announcing
"We Austrians Will Vote For Whom We Want!"
Nor was the indignation limited to nationalists. In her account of the
Waldheim Affair in the New Yorker, Jane Kramer recorded that the mother of
the magazine journalist who exposed Waldheim -- a resistance fighter
interred at Auschwitz -- actually voted for Waldheim, because "of the
hypocrisy of the whole campaign" against him. Jews voted for Waldheim, too,
including, probably, Bruno Kreisky, the popular chancellor who had included
Holocaust-collaborators such as Peter in his government. Kreisky was the
soul of pragmatism: if he excluded competent one-time Nazis from posts, he
pointed out, he wouldn't have much to work with.
people, the satisfied children of historian Daniel Goldhagen's willing
executioners, if not the executioners themselves. In 2010, I interviewed
Neal Sher, who was at the time of the Waldheim Affair, as it came to be
known, the chief prosecutor in the Office of Special Investigations, the
U.S. Justice Department division that investigates war criminals. Sher
recalled a pair of old Austrian women who, having seen his picture in the
newspaper, approached him in a Vienna café. He smiled and greeted them.
"Judenschweine!" they hissed back.
Waldheim's campaign managers, on the other hand, understood Austria
perfectly. Even while he denied the charges, they designed campaign posters
that looked like National Socialist propaganda. They warned crowds of a
Jewish plot emanating from New York. (At the same time, because of his
years at the U.N., Waldheim chose as his campaign theme song "New York, New
York.") It worked. The Socialists realized that every time they brought up
the war, they didn't win voters, but lost them. Someone, maybe from
Waldheim's campaign, maybe just a fed-up citizen, posted flyers announcing
"We Austrians Will Vote For Whom We Want!"
Nor was the indignation limited to nationalists. In her account of the
Waldheim Affair in the New Yorker, Jane Kramer recorded that the mother of
the magazine journalist who exposed Waldheim -- a resistance fighter
interred at Auschwitz -- actually voted for Waldheim, because "of the
hypocrisy of the whole campaign" against him. Jews voted for Waldheim, too,
including, probably, Bruno Kreisky, the popular chancellor who had included
Holocaust-collaborators such as Peter in his government. Kreisky was the
soul of pragmatism: if he excluded competent one-time Nazis from posts, he
pointed out, he wouldn't have much to work with.
Kreisky was also tired of
hearing about the past, just as most Austrians, including Jews, were tired
of hearing about the past -- just as most Kenyans are tired of it today.
(And if they had to hear about it, they certainly didn't want to hear about
it from the Americans, who in the late 1940s, it was well known, had
recruited Nazis, including some prominent Austrians, to use against the
Soviets.) No less than Nazi-hunter Simon Weisenthal came to Waldheim's
defense.
Waldheim won the presidency handily. This presented a headache in
Washington, which, it was easy to forget, he'd often gone out of his way to
help. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, he'd acted as a shuttle between
Israel, Egypt, the White House, and the Kremlin (eliciting from Henry
Kissinger the most un-Kissingerian sentence of his career: "Thank god for
the United Nations"). In 1979, Waldheim had flown to Tehran to try to
negotiate the release of American hostages, and for his troubles was abused
by the Ayatollah's drudges.
Unluckily for him, however, World War II was an inviolable canon for then
president Ronald Reagan. (Unlike Waldheim, he hadn't fought in it.) When
the Justice Department reached its conclusions -- that Waldheim had
"assisted or participated in the transfer of civilian prisoners to the SS
for exploitation as slave labor, the mass deportation of civilians to
concentration and death camps" and "the utilization of anti-Semitic
propaganda; the mistreatment and execution of Allied prisoners; and
reprisal executions of hostages and other civilians" -- Reagan, whose sense
of humor was always undervalued, did two things: He sent Waldheim a
congratulatory note on winning the election; then he added his name to a
list of people barred from entering the United States.
It was the strongest international rebuke. Israel merely recalled its
ambassador. Nevertheless, Moscow denounced the Washington-Zionist axis, as
did Arab League nations; never particularly interested in Austria before,
they now extended effusive invitations to Waldheim. Pope John Paul II not
only met with Waldheim but, bizarrely, conferred on him a papal knighthood.
He was followed by Vaclav Havel, who, as usual, stole the show. Invited by
Waldheim to address the Salzburg Festival in 1990, the Czech president
agreed, defying a tacit boycott of Austria by European leaders. Havel spoke
on the redemptive powers of confronting one's past.
Waldheim died in 2007, never having come clean about his war record, even
after more revelations emerged. Before expiring, he was, amazingly, invited
to Israel. He went, and without actually telling the truth, apologized for
not being more truthful.
What can Kenya's allies learn from the Waldheim Affair? One lesson is that
diplomatic isolation makes a nation's internal neuroses worse, not better.
After Waldheim, Austria went from being unremorseful about its history to
aggressively conflicted. It twice elected Nazi apologist Jörg Haider to a
governorship, and then imprisoned historian David Irving for denying the
Holocaust.
of hearing about the past -- just as most Kenyans are tired of it today.
(And if they had to hear about it, they certainly didn't want to hear about
it from the Americans, who in the late 1940s, it was well known, had
recruited Nazis, including some prominent Austrians, to use against the
Soviets.) No less than Nazi-hunter Simon Weisenthal came to Waldheim's
defense.
Waldheim won the presidency handily. This presented a headache in
Washington, which, it was easy to forget, he'd often gone out of his way to
help. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, he'd acted as a shuttle between
Israel, Egypt, the White House, and the Kremlin (eliciting from Henry
Kissinger the most un-Kissingerian sentence of his career: "Thank god for
the United Nations"). In 1979, Waldheim had flown to Tehran to try to
negotiate the release of American hostages, and for his troubles was abused
by the Ayatollah's drudges.
Unluckily for him, however, World War II was an inviolable canon for then
president Ronald Reagan. (Unlike Waldheim, he hadn't fought in it.) When
the Justice Department reached its conclusions -- that Waldheim had
"assisted or participated in the transfer of civilian prisoners to the SS
for exploitation as slave labor, the mass deportation of civilians to
concentration and death camps" and "the utilization of anti-Semitic
propaganda; the mistreatment and execution of Allied prisoners; and
reprisal executions of hostages and other civilians" -- Reagan, whose sense
of humor was always undervalued, did two things: He sent Waldheim a
congratulatory note on winning the election; then he added his name to a
list of people barred from entering the United States.
It was the strongest international rebuke. Israel merely recalled its
ambassador. Nevertheless, Moscow denounced the Washington-Zionist axis, as
did Arab League nations; never particularly interested in Austria before,
they now extended effusive invitations to Waldheim. Pope John Paul II not
only met with Waldheim but, bizarrely, conferred on him a papal knighthood.
He was followed by Vaclav Havel, who, as usual, stole the show. Invited by
Waldheim to address the Salzburg Festival in 1990, the Czech president
agreed, defying a tacit boycott of Austria by European leaders. Havel spoke
on the redemptive powers of confronting one's past.
Waldheim died in 2007, never having come clean about his war record, even
after more revelations emerged. Before expiring, he was, amazingly, invited
to Israel. He went, and without actually telling the truth, apologized for
not being more truthful.
What can Kenya's allies learn from the Waldheim Affair? One lesson is that
diplomatic isolation makes a nation's internal neuroses worse, not better.
After Waldheim, Austria went from being unremorseful about its history to
aggressively conflicted. It twice elected Nazi apologist Jörg Haider to a
governorship, and then imprisoned historian David Irving for denying the
Holocaust.
Something similar may already be coming to pass in Kenya, where,
after inviting in scores of international observers and media organizations
to cover the election, the government, unhappy with the coverage, is
threatening to expel foreign journalists. (Uhuru Kenyatta has accused the
British government of trying to deny him the election.)
Another lesson is that while a proud nation can endure its own shame, it
won't abide the shame of others. That Kenya received $875 million in U.S.
assistance in 2012 doesn't make Kenyans feel any more obliged to
Washington's best hopes for them. Nor does the fact that Kenya is a
signatory to the International Criminal Court, while the United States is
not.
after inviting in scores of international observers and media organizations
to cover the election, the government, unhappy with the coverage, is
threatening to expel foreign journalists. (Uhuru Kenyatta has accused the
British government of trying to deny him the election.)
Another lesson is that while a proud nation can endure its own shame, it
won't abide the shame of others. That Kenya received $875 million in U.S.
assistance in 2012 doesn't make Kenyans feel any more obliged to
Washington's best hopes for them. Nor does the fact that Kenya is a
signatory to the International Criminal Court, while the United States is
not.
After Carson made his remark about choices and consequences, there was
much talk about the new Kenyan friendships with China and Russia.
Kenyatta's sworn-enemy-turned-running-
charges at the ICC for backing the Kalenjin gangs that battled Kenyatta's
Kikuyu gangs, responded to Carson by saying "We know that you have a
stooge, a puppet. But now that you have realized your stooge is going
nowhere, you have resorted to threats." He was referring to defeated Prime
Minister Raila Odinga, and, though exaggerating for effect, he was
essentially right.
much talk about the new Kenyan friendships with China and Russia.
Kenyatta's sworn-enemy-turned-running-
charges at the ICC for backing the Kalenjin gangs that battled Kenyatta's
Kikuyu gangs, responded to Carson by saying "We know that you have a
stooge, a puppet. But now that you have realized your stooge is going
nowhere, you have resorted to threats." He was referring to defeated Prime
Minister Raila Odinga, and, though exaggerating for effect, he was
essentially right.
Odinga was the candidate of the West, as well as of the
Kenyan intellectual classes, not just because he isn't indicted -- though,
according to Kenyan reports, he probably should have been -- but because he
represented, they felt, Kenyans' only chance to confront their past.
Imprisoned and tortured in the 1980s for his efforts to reform Kenya,
Odinga evokes the tragic strain in its history. He sees himself as an
essential lump in the national throat, offering liberation through truth,
if only Kenyans would agree to weep.
But most Kenyans don't want to weep. They want to forget the past, as this
election shows, not confront it. They didn't care to hear, again, about the
murders and evictions that accompanied the 2007 election, nor about the
decades of grief that came before. Kramer wrote of Austrian Jews in the
1986 that they "liked the euphemistic surfaces of Austrian life," and the
same can be said of Kenyans today.
Kenyan intellectual classes, not just because he isn't indicted -- though,
according to Kenyan reports, he probably should have been -- but because he
represented, they felt, Kenyans' only chance to confront their past.
Imprisoned and tortured in the 1980s for his efforts to reform Kenya,
Odinga evokes the tragic strain in its history. He sees himself as an
essential lump in the national throat, offering liberation through truth,
if only Kenyans would agree to weep.
But most Kenyans don't want to weep. They want to forget the past, as this
election shows, not confront it. They didn't care to hear, again, about the
murders and evictions that accompanied the 2007 election, nor about the
decades of grief that came before. Kramer wrote of Austrian Jews in the
1986 that they "liked the euphemistic surfaces of Austrian life," and the
same can be said of Kenyans today.
A nation of aspiring entrepreneurs (and,
like Americans, lifestyle-aspirants in the ballot booth), they preferred to
recall the theme of success in Kenyan history. Perhaps the most telling
summary of this election that I heard was a ten-second FM radio service
announcement that aired a few weeks before voting: "It's important the
youth remember Kenya is a brand," the DJ purred, "a brand people are
comfortable investing in." Nobody symbolizes the comforts of investment
like Kenyatta, maybe the country's richest man, through little effort of
his own. His family is the premier brand in Kenya.
What Kenyatta's foreign critics, like Waldheim's, failed to concede -- this
may be the most valuable lesson -- is that countries will confront their
pasts, or not, only on their own terms. In post-conflict societies, many
public figures have blood on their hands. Kenyans are as aware of this now
as Austrians once were. They can take it. What they don't want is
sanctimony. They'd far rather see defiance, even if it entails a certain
sadistic hypocrisy.
like Americans, lifestyle-aspirants in the ballot booth), they preferred to
recall the theme of success in Kenyan history. Perhaps the most telling
summary of this election that I heard was a ten-second FM radio service
announcement that aired a few weeks before voting: "It's important the
youth remember Kenya is a brand," the DJ purred, "a brand people are
comfortable investing in." Nobody symbolizes the comforts of investment
like Kenyatta, maybe the country's richest man, through little effort of
his own. His family is the premier brand in Kenya.
What Kenyatta's foreign critics, like Waldheim's, failed to concede -- this
may be the most valuable lesson -- is that countries will confront their
pasts, or not, only on their own terms. In post-conflict societies, many
public figures have blood on their hands. Kenyans are as aware of this now
as Austrians once were. They can take it. What they don't want is
sanctimony. They'd far rather see defiance, even if it entails a certain
sadistic hypocrisy.
So, like the Auschwitz survivors who voted for
Waldheim, Kenyans who saw family and friends killed after the last election
voted for Kenyatta, though they knew he may have ordered those deaths. No,
because he may have ordered those deaths. He allied with Ruto not to avoid
these dark imputations, but to drive them home. Though tribe was the
watchword of this election, their alliance, and their victory, was
nationalistic, not tribal -- just as Waldheim's was. Their unspoken but
resounding message was this: *Yes, we killed. We killed for you, for Kenya.
And we'd kill again*. It's the most seductive platform in politics.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
Waldheim, Kenyans who saw family and friends killed after the last election
voted for Kenyatta, though they knew he may have ordered those deaths. No,
because he may have ordered those deaths. He allied with Ruto not to avoid
these dark imputations, but to drive them home. Though tribe was the
watchword of this election, their alliance, and their victory, was
nationalistic, not tribal -- just as Waldheim's was. Their unspoken but
resounding message was this: *Yes, we killed. We killed for you, for Kenya.
And we'd kill again*. It's the most seductive platform in politics.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
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