Thursday, May 14, 2009



By Milton Obote Joshua
May 13, 2009
Amherst, MA

Folks, it would take a cartographic genius to map the contours of an island such as Migingo and to delimit sovereign boundaries on the basis of the fluid line where water meets land. I hope I am wrong on this, but Museveni seems to be that genius.

Kenya can claim Migingo (the land) but not a centimetre of the water around it. How this can be determined in the event of the seasonal rise and fall of tidal waves is impossible to imagine. Why would Museveni advance such a cartographic insanity? Could it be the only way to concretize an issue that was nonexistent in the first place?

My interpretation of Museveni's bizarre claim is that Migingo has turned out to be the proverbial hot potato that he cannot juggle anymore. Our attention should not be on Museveni but on those that may have given him the potato in the first place.

It is uncanny that on realising that the just launched boarder survey will vindicate Kenya’s claim on Migingo, Museveni cannot help but give voice to the whole rationale behind the dispute. It had nothing to do with Kenya but everything to do with these “jaluos”.

Isn’t it also uncanny that Museveni’s disparaging of the “Jaluos”, sounds like a variant of MP Mbogua’s recent “curse from the lake” comment or Kimunya’s earlier comment about the NSE not being “ a fish market”?

The common basis of these comments makes it difficult to disentangle the Migingo ruse from the political mindset of the ruling ethno-elite in Kenya against a section of her citizenry.

Kenyatta made it an official policy. Moi , perhaps out of fear of the ethnic elite that nourished his presidency, perpetuated it to the hilt. Kibaki, unable to transcend the seminal limitation of ethnic righteousness sowed during Kenyatta’s time, remains irredeemably captive to the exclusionary ethno-centred principle of governance.

It is sad to say that in Kenya, this model of governance has always relied on fear of the “Jaluos” as its raison d'etre. It has consistently focused less on the economics of development, the progressive vitality of inclusiveness for all citizenry, and the necessity of equal, if not equitable representation in government, but more on the strengthening of the infrastructure for ethnic domination and quiescent management.

We should not be worried about these because as Kenyans, we have managed, albeit slowly, to push our governing systems towards a transformation—the limitations of our statutes and institutions notwithstanding.

What is worrying about Museveni’s outburst about the “Jaluos”—which is why I invoke the attributes of the uncanny—is its resonance to the echo chamber of Kenya’s ruling ethno-elite.

Ever since the Migingo issue assumed national visibility, the reactions and movements of Kibaki, Saitoti, Wetangula, Ali and the idiotic Mutua etc engendered a perception that Uganda held all the cards in respect of Migingo, and that Kenya had little or no interest in it.

Sadly similar views were echoed by the likes of, Njoki Ndungu and other ethno-inspired columnists who hang on the hope of inheriting and perpetuating current hegemonic tendencies once Kibaki’s generation gets out of the picture.

It might turn out that Kibaki and his retinue of aging advisors deliberately asked Museveni to act in such a way as to externalize the “Jaluo problem” in the hope that it would deflect the said “Jaluos” attention away from the reform starved leadership in Nairobi. That as long as Raila and his “Jaluo” fishermen redirected their energies toward Migingo, Kibaki might just breathe easy.

Kibaki and Museveni banked on the possibility of alienating Raila from his perceived base as long as it appeared that he is woefully handicapped to initiate action on Migingo, by a paralysis that betrays the expectation of his official perch.

Meanwhile efforts were to be placed on driving a wedge between the “Jaluos” and the Kalenjin, hence the ill-conceived KK alliance talk where Mbogua directly attacked the Luo community, and the tepid support given to the PM in respect of the Mau Forest evictions and resettlement.

Letting Raila appear to be the one hell bent on evictions from the Mau was intended to project him in bad light amongst the Kipsigis. It seems to have worked if you bear in mind the short sighted and ill-informed comments of Isaac Ruto, Kutuny and Magerer among others. the PM has been wise not to plunge headlong into the snare.

In the mix is the unsettling inclusion of NCCK in the blame all strategy where every failing by Kibaki must be blamed on both as a way of chipping away at Hon Raila’s credibility and viability for future leadership.

The weak link was the inability to anticipate wananchi’s reaction. Museveni did not count on the disruption of the supply line to Uganda. When, therefore Kibera happened despite assurances from Kibaki, and threats were issued by wananchi to disrupt movement on the Busia and Malaba corridors, Museveni was left with no alternative but to drop the ball.

By so audibly disparaging “Jaluos’ on the BBC interview, he is subtly letting people into the backstage scene of whole mischief even as he points toward the direction of its conception—Kibaki and the ruling ethno-elite mindset that has struggled to frame the “Jaluos” as Kenya's inside-outsiders. Our anger should not be directed at Museveni but those at whose behest, he held the Migingo brief which with the wisdom of hindsight, he now realizes he should not have done. Folks, it is non other than Kibaki and PNU.

hat Kibaki has reached a level where he now outsources Kenya’s discrimination of an ethnic community to a foreign government is beyond outrage-for lack of a better term. It is one big reason Kibaki should not be Kenya’s leader. Externalizing domestic problems is an old political strategy that is effective only when it is conceived and executed with basic intelligence.

The crudity with which this one was conceived is reason enough to have its planners charged for treason and punished accordingly.